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piest in my top-boots, striding through the heart of the forest, where I hear nothing but the knocking and hammering of the woodpecker, far away from your civilization."

It is also safe to say that no one who seeks the real Bismarck can find him in these volumes alone. Here we have Bismarck in his working dress, with his tobacco and liquor, talking always with his inferiors, the plodding scholar Bucher, the mirror-like Busch. With them he could safely relieve his mind of the acrid temper that heavy responsibility and the dyspepsia had combined to store there, or he could amuse himself by playing Jupiter Olympius amid a group of reverent and acquiescent worshippers. In his own *Memoirs* on the other hand Bismarck is always in full uniform, as Imperial Chancellor, with dignity describing and defending his state-craft. Both these characters belong to the real Bismarck, and without the aid of Dr. Busch the world would scarcely have known the former type, which is far the more interesting. Busch is certainly as silly as Boswell and almost as persistent, and Bismarck displayed an almost sublime sense of security in admitting such a man to intimacy. No other statesman of modern Europe has been so often photographed by the instantaneous process. Perhaps no other statesman has been so confident of his own unique greatness and solitary supremacy that he has become accustomed to think aloud, without reserve, in the presence of his servants. But this suggests again the question, which nine years ago vexed William II. : After 1870 was the German Emperor the man who held the title?

CHARLES H. LEVERMORE.

Gedanken und Erinnerungen von OTTO Fürst von BISMARCK. (New York and Stuttgart : J. G. Cotta. 1898. Pp. xxvi, 647.)

Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman: Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of OTTO, Prince von BISMARCK, written and dictated by himself after his retirement from office. Translated from the German under the supervision of A. J. Butler, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. (New York and London : Harper and Brothers. 1899. Two vols., pp. xxi, 415 ; xx, 362.)

HAD Julius Caesar left us reminiscences not only of his wars but also of his political activity, and had he interspersed reflections upon the history of the republic since the Gracchi, upon the organization of the new monarchy and upon the policy to be followed in dealing with Rome's allies and enemies, it is needless to inquire what importance historical students would attach to such a book. Of course, there are weak points in this comparison. Bismarck has left behind him results that promise to be permanent, but it is not likely that these will seem as momentous to scholars of the thirty-eighth century as the results of Caesar's life still seem to us. In Caesar's case, moreover, we do not possess what our remote descendants will possess in Bismarck's—letters and speeches covering the man's whole public life and showing his position at every critical

moment. But after allowing for all these differences, we may reasonably expect that Macaulay's New Zealander will regard Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences* as material of the highest value for the study of nineteenth-century history.

We, however, naturally regard the book from the angle of to-day, and we ask, as any conscientious journalist would ask: What has Bismarck told us that we did not know before? and then: Has he told us the truth? If we answer the second question in the negative, the first will of course lose most of its interest. Now Lothar Bucher, who wrote at Bismarck's dictation the first draft of these memoirs, told Busch more than once, that the work was going badly. Bismarck, said Bucher, confused his dates and his causal sequences, and—what was worse—he labored under a double bias. He wished to justify himself and was unwilling to admit that he had made any mistakes; and he wished to influence the politics of the day and was using history simply as argument (Busch, II. 541 *et seq.*, 565 *et seq.*). Bucher was a man of great ability and was very familiar with Bismarck's career; but in weighing his criticism, as exclusively reported by Busch, several things are to be remembered. Busch was keenly aware of the commercial value which his diary would possess after Bismarck's death, and he regarded Bismarck's memoirs as a rival work, which might interfere with the sale of his own. Under the influence of this bias, he may have exaggerated Bucher's criticism. When he published this criticism in his book, last year, he had no correction to fear, for Bucher died in 1893. If however we assume that Busch's report is exact, it is still possible that Bucher exaggerated the points of difference between Bismarck and himself. His discussion with Bismarck was of course conducted with a degree of restraint; in talking with Busch, he was able to express himself without restraint; and in the reaction he may well have said more than he really meant. Busch filled his diary with things said in hot blood; and as cold type cannot reproduce the tone, he fills his readers with false impressions. Finally, Bucher indicates (through Busch) that he was struggling to correct Bismarck's bias (and in spite of his discouragement he carried on the struggle to his death), but he does not indicate the result. This we have in the present book, which was repeatedly revised in type before Bismarck's death. In this book there is certainly no such falsification of history as Busch's report of Bucher's utterances might have led us to expect. Bismarck may have confused his dates and sequences, but he and Bucher together seem to have been able to clear up the confusion. Bismarck may have wished to justify himself, and the book shows traces of this natural disposition, but it exhibits no stronger bias than we expect in autobiographies. Bismarck may have valued history as politics teaching by example, but it does not appear that he found it necessary to invent examples. Horst Kohl, a historian with a reputation to guard, has edited the book and has not hesitated to make corrections in foot-notes. Not many such corrections have been found necessary, nor are they of much importance. In his preface, Kohl testifies to Bismarck's "fast untrügliches Gedächtniss."

As to the other question proposed—concerning the increment of information in the book—it may be said broadly that few important facts are here for the first time disclosed. New light is thrown, in some instances, upon well-known events ; and throughout the story the personal elements are emphasized. In the scenes from the revolution of 1848 (Chapter II.) Bismarck makes clear what the Liberal historians of the period invariably ignore—that the movement was essentially a town affair. The peasants of his own district, as he satisfied himself before he went to Berlin, were quite ready to fight “*die Städter*.” At court he found the greatest confusion and headlessness. The only man in the royal family, William, had been sent away to hide himself. The King had no idea of resistance ; his only scheme was to swim with the current. Augusta foresaw his abdication ; imagined that her husband would be forced to waive his rights ; and was planning, in accordance with French precedents, to save the throne for her boy, Frederick, with herself as regent under a Liberal ministry. Bismarck tried to stir up the generals to act for the King without his authorization, but found no one of sufficiently high rank who would take the responsibility. That the King could have crushed the revolutionary movement Bismarck does not doubt ; and he suggests that the moral authority which Prussia would have acquired, as the only solid Conservative government west of Russia, would have facilitated the extension of her influence in Germany. If this line of policy had been followed with decision while Austria was paralyzed by internal conflicts, Germany might have been unified by dynastic agreements in 1848. The other course open to Prussia—the establishment of German unity with the aid of the German revolutionists—was much less promising ; for this plan “overrated the barricades” and underestimated the real strength of the dynasties (cf. Ch. XIII.). If, in either of these ways, Germany had been unified in 1848, the wars with Austria and with France would still have been inevitable : they would merely have come after the establishment of the empire instead of coming before it.

A policy which fluctuated between these courses and adopted neither could lead only to failure. Moreover, the army had been neglected ; and the knowledge of its condition, Bismarck tells us, caused him to defend in the Diet those negotiations which led to Olmütz. He tells us elsewhere, however, that the view of the events of 1848–50 which he took at the time was very different from the view which he sets forth in his book. His earlier view was essentially that of his “fraction,” which was friendly to Austria. He was still “*gut oestreichisch*” when he went to Frankfort. The turning-point was reached when at Frankfort he first got sight of Schwarzenberg’s despatch of December 7, 1850, with its famous “*avilir, puis démolir*.” If this is not true, it ought to be. It will certainly find its way into the Prussian school histories.

Bismarck attempts no recapitulation of his Frankfort diplomacy : that has been fully set forth in his Frankfort despatches and by Sybel. He gives us pictures of princes and diplomatists, some entertaining anecdotes,

and some valuable glimpses of court factions and contending policies at Berlin. Of the same character is his tenth chapter, on his life at St. Petersburg. New, in part, and very interesting is the antecedent history of his entry into the Prussian ministry. Frederick William suggested this more than once ; and in 1856 he said : " You have got to be minister." Bismarck, however, did not take this seriously : the King, he believed, was playing him off against Manteuffel in order to bring the latter to terms. Nor did Bismarck desire to be minister under Frederick William, for the King expected from all his ministers absolute obedience. From 1860 on, William repeatedly considered the question of making Bismarck a minister. On this point Bismarck's narrative confirms Sybel's story—a story which Marcks, in his *Kaiser Wilhelm I.*, has treated as a legend. At the same time Bismarck partially confirms what Marcks says of William's disinclination to make the appointment : the King, as Bismarck notes, was decidedly cool to him. Augusta opposed the appointment ; and letters from Roon to Bismarck show the importance that was attached to her opposition. During Bismarck's brief stay in France, in 1862, Napoleon III. offered to conclude a formal alliance with Prussia, asserting that he had himself received a similar offer from Austria. The telegram from Roon which summoned Bismarck back to Berlin is given : it read "*Periculum in mora.*"

Before giving us any of his reminiscences as minister, Bismarck interpolates a remarkable survey (Ch. XII.) of Prussian policy from 1790 to 1862, summing it up in the apothegm : " It is frequently less dangerous to do the wrong thing than to do nothing." Light is thrown on Bismarck's policy during the Polish insurrection by a study of the contending factions at the Russian court. Bismarck desired Russian friendship, but not an alliance. In 1863 Russia offered an alliance against Austria ; but this, like Napoleon's offer, was declined. Bismarck was never disposed to ally his state with any power which, after victory, might exercise a predominant influence. In noticing the opposition of the Crown Prince throughout the *Confliktzeit*, Bismarck represents himself as having repressed William's desire to deal sternly with Frederick, but the narrative should be read in connection with the documents printed near the end of Busch's second volume. In describing Austria's attempt to increase her ascendancy in Germany through the Congress of Princes (1863), Bismarck points out that the effect of Prussia's abstention was to frighten the smaller states. These were willing to go into any arrangement in which they could play off Austria against Prussia and Prussia against Austria, but they were quite unwilling to deliver themselves into the hands of either power alone. Their refusal to go with Austria gave offense to that power and paved the way for the Austro-Prussian concert and the joint intervention in Schleswig-Holstein. In explaining this phase of Austrian policy, much stress is also laid upon the friendly relations which Bismarck had established with Rechberg at Frankfort. The war with Austria became inevitable when Rechberg was driven from the premiership and this was due not so much to the Schleswig-Holstein

question as to Prussia's unwillingness to make any concessions to Austria's desire to enter the Customs Union. These concessions were refused, against Bismarck's judgment, by his colleagues in the Prussian cabinet. In this part of the narrative, and especially in Chapter XVII., there is much to confirm Sybel's contention that Bismarck would have been content with a joint control of Germany by Austria and Prussia, and that it was only the failure of this experiment that compelled Prussia to drive Austria out of Germany. It may be questioned, however, whether both Sybel and Bismarck were not influenced, in describing this phase of Prussian policy, by a desire to strengthen, or at least not to weaken, the present ties between the two empires. Bismarck's utterances, both in letters prior to 1862 and in speeches after 1866, indicate that he never believed in dualism as a permanent arrangement.

In Bismarck's struggle to restrain the King and the military party after Sadowa, and to secure a speedy peace on terms that would leave no implacable resentment smouldering in Austria, Bismarck tells us that he was strongly supported by the Crown Prince—that it was indeed the Crown Prince who persuaded the King to accept Bismarck's advice. In explaining the concessions made to the Liberal party in 1866, Bismarck frankly admits that "universal suffrage" was inserted in his German programme simply as a weapon against Austria. He tells us also that he never believed in the secret ballot, which robs property of its legitimate influence.

Bismarck's account of the genesis of the war with France is disappointing. He adheres to the statement that he did not expect the Spanish candidacy to become a *casus belli*; he makes no mention of the negotiations that were in progress for a French-Austrian-Italian alliance against Prussia; and he defends his action in forcing the war on one ground only—that Prussia, by submitting to the insults she had received from France, would have lost all influence in South Germany.

As regards the internal politics of Prussia and Germany after 1870, the *Reminiscences* offer little that is new, except that Bismarck repudiates personal responsibility for the mistakes of the "Culturkampf" and for the breach with the National Liberal party in 1879. In the former case the blame is laid upon Falk; in the latter it is divided between the National Liberals, who asked too much, and the King, who was unwilling to concede anything. That the National Liberals were at this time intriguing with Augusta's Tories and Ultramontanes to drive Bismarck from power is a statement that we cannot credit. Politics make strange bedfellows, but hardly so strange a fellowship as this.

As regards the European politics of this period, we learn nothing new. The guiding principles of Bismarck's diplomacy are however set forth in a masterly way in Chapters XXIX. and XXX. He asserts that no firm alliance was, or is, open to Germany except with Russia or Austria; and he thinks that the Russian alliance, had it been possible to maintain it, would in many respects have been preferable to the Austrian, because of Russia's greater internal stability. In speaking of Russia's ex-

periences in the Balkan peninsula, he launches a maxim the truth of which we are learning: "Liberated nations are not grateful but exacting."

The greatest contribution, on the whole, that this book makes to our knowledge of German and European history during the latter half of the nineteenth century is to be found in its gallery of historical portraits. Bismarck's power of delineating character has long been appreciated: his Frankfort letters and despatches gave us striking examples. At Frankfort, however, he drew ministers and attachés; in this book he paints royalties and premiers. The picture of William I. is elaborated with especial care and with evident sympathy; but Frederick William IV., Augusta, Frederick, Victoria and Gortschakoff are made equally real. William II. is not included, for the *Reminiscences* close with the death of Frederick. It has been stated, however, in the German press, that Bismarck has left a third volume which may at some future time be published.

The German edition offered in the United States is not made in Germany. It appears that the Harpers, who have the monopoly of the English version, warned the Cottas that the original German version could not be imported. It is to be regretted that this question was not tested in the courts; but the Cottas presumably acted on the advice of counsel in determining to print and publish the German text in New York. They might, however, have given us a better reprint. Their American edition is compressed into one volume, printed on thin paper of the poorest quality and flimsily bound. It is full of misprints, particularly in the French, English and Latin citations.

The English edition is well printed and bound; and it has a fairly good index, which the German-American edition lacks. The translation is, on the whole, good, but it is over-literal: some sentences are made almost unintelligible by a too scrupulous adherence to the wording of the original. "School" and "college" are hardly equivalents for *Gymnasium* and *Universität*, and "Free-thought party" suggests ideas not indicated by the German *freisinnig*. (The position of this group in the German fractional system would have been best indicated by calling it the Radical party.) And why the uncouth adjective "Frederickian?"

MUNROE SMITH.

De Soto and His Men in the Land of Florida. By GRACE KING.
(New York: The Macmillan Co. 1898. Pp. xiv, 326.)

THE attempt of the author to weave into a continuous story the important parts of the several contemporary narratives of the expedition of De Soto, enlightened with modern criticism, is not without success. It has resulted in presenting the history of the conquest of Florida in the most attractive and readable form in which it has yet appeared in English. It makes it read like a romance—a romance tainted with the rapacity and cruelty of the Spanish conquerors. Nor is the work without scholarship, for a careful comparison of the principal accounts with each other and a consideration of more recent historical criticism of the sub-